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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
Since 2007, low-performing schools have received more than $5.8 billion in funds through the federal School Improve-
ment Grant (SIG) program.1  Supplementary district and state funds, federal Title I funds, and Race to the Top funds have 
also been used to turn around the country’s lowest-performing schools. Despite some cases of success, our school im-
provement dollars and programs, as a whole, are not resulting in the substantial improvements that were intended and—
more importantly—that are so greatly needed.
With the revision and significant expansion of the federal SIG program and the introduction of the Race to the Top 
program in 2010, the public charter school model was prioritized as a discrete option for school turnaround. Currently, 
there are three main avenues through which public charter school autonomy can be leveraged to drive school turnaround 
efforts:
1. Traditional public school restart (TPS restart): Converting a low-performing traditional public school to public 
charter school status via the SIG restart model or via another accountability mechanism that requires a turnaround 
strategy;
2. Closure and replacement: Starting one or more new charters schools in locations with high concentrations of re-
cently closed low-performing schools; and
3. Charter school restart (charter restart): Transferring management of an underperforming public charter school to 
new management and new board governance.
This paper examines how the autonomies related to staffing, curriculum, and general operations provided by state charter 
laws can be used to catalyze school turnaround efforts. Specifically, it explores the TPS restart model through brief case 
studies of three charter management organizations (CMOs)—Green Dot, LEAD, and Mastery—that have restarted tradi-
tional public schools in Los Angeles, Nashville, and Philadelphia and Camden, respectively.
“We’re not doing anything magical, we’re just doing the hard work.”  
—Chris Reynolds, CEO, LEAD Public Schools 
Key Findings
Autonomy
The charter school operators highlighted due to their success in TPS restart efforts consistently noted that when they 
are given the appropriate autonomy and are able to implement their models with fidelity, students achieve. The charter 
school autonomies identified as the most beneficial through this report’s case studies were:
• Staffing: Freedom in hiring, placement, incentives, professional development, and removal of staff; 
• Use of Time: Freedom to determine the length of the school day or year, and how to allocate student and staff 
time; 
• Programming: Freedom to determine the academic program and wraparound services; 
• Finances: Freedom to allocate district, state, and federal dollars to priority areas that benefit students; and 
• Access to Facilities: Freedom to own, maintain, and renovate a building, or have the building renovated and main-
tained by the district according to the operator’s standards.
4Charter ing Turnaround: Leveraging Publ ic  Charter  School  Autonomy to Address Fai lure
Turning around a Failing School Is More Complex than Starting a New One 
Turning around a low-performing school by converting it to charter governance and enlisting new leadership and per-
sonnel is more difficult than launching a typical “new start” charter school. Whereas starting a new school from scratch 
poses notable challenges (e.g., securing a facility, developing a program from scratch, and creating operational systems), 
restarting an organization that has previously failed presents far more dynamic challenges, including the following:
• Overlapping accountability systems: State accountability systems, as well as grant regulations, may stipulate that 
turnaround providers must develop detailed turnaround plans reflecting prescribed turnaround models and meet 
reporting and accountability requirements in addition to requirements stipulated by state charter school laws.
• Transitional costs: Restarts have “start-up” costs as part of the transition process, such as upgrading facilities, 
acquiring student records, developing bus routes, and paying for transportation and staff time—which can total 
millions of dollars.
• Zoned enrollment: Unlike a typical new start charter school, TPS restart schools are not selected by parents exer-
cising school choice. A TPS restart serves all students in a zoned location, including students with varying levels of 
knowledge or investment in the school’s program. 
• Human capital: Restarting a school can require significant staffing changes. The restaffing process can alienate com-
munity members as well as present challenges in finding qualified staff to meet the unique needs of the school. The 
CMO leaders we interviewed all discussed the challenge associated with recruiting, hiring, and retaining high-quality 
staff.
• Facilities: The quality of the school buildings and confusion over who is responsible for their upkeep can be a major 
challenge for public charter school operators undertaking a TPS restart.
• Sustainability: District and CMO bandwidth and capacity, as well as unrealistic timelines, can undermine efforts to 
sustain the turnarounds.
Opportunities Outweigh Challenges 
Charter school autonomies have the potential to catalyze focused school turnaround efforts. Yet, to date, states and 
districts have arguably not fully leveraged turnaround strategies that involve granting traditional public schools charter 
school freedoms as part of the turnaround process. Widespread conversion of persistently low-performing schools to char-
ter governance status, or seeding development of new charter schools in high-needs areas to leverage charter autonomy 
to create quality schools has been limited by both policy and practice. 
While turning around failing schools is difficult and complex work, all three CMO leaders interviewed for this paper 
highlighted how rewarding the work is and how much turnarounds have positively influenced the efficiency of the district 
central office and the services provided in all of the operators’ schools. Marco Petruzzi of Green Dot emphasized that “all 
experienced CMOs should be doing this work. Everyone who has a student enrollment above 5,000 or 6,000 students 
should be taking this on.”
High-quality public charter school operators, and the freedom they have to implement effective educational programs, 
could fundamentally change the current thinking about school building–focused turnaround and improvement strategies. 
Much work remains, however, to ensure that such efforts fully optimize key autonomies that can catalyze change.
INTRODUCTION
Since 2007, low-performing schools have received 
through the federal School Improvement Grant (SIG pro-
gram) more than $5.8 billion in funds, which are allocat-
ed to states to make significant investments in improving 
their lowest-performing schools.2  In addition, supple-
mentary district and state funds, federal Title I funds, 
and federal Race to the Top funds have also been used 
to turn around the country’s lowest-performing schools. 
Yet, despite all of these sources of funding, many of the 
schools receiving these various grants have failed to make 
a dramatic difference in improving student achievement. 
Some schools made significant improvements, some 
made incremental improvements, others stagnated, and 
the student achievement levels in the remaining schools 
actually declined.3  Despite some cases of success, our 
school improvement dollars and programs, as a whole, 
are not resulting in the substantial improvements that 
were intended and—more importantly—that are so 
greatly needed.
With the revision and significant expansion of the federal 
SIG program and the introduction of the Race to the Top 
program in 2010, the public charter school model was 
prioritized as a discrete option for school turnaround. 
Currently, there are three main avenues of school turn-
around in which public charter school autonomy can be 
leveraged:
1. Traditional public school restart (TPS restart): 
Converting a low-performing traditional public 
school to public charter school status via the SIG 
restart model or via another accountability mecha-
nism that requires a turnaround strategy;
2. Closure and replacement: Starting one or more 
new charter schools in locations with high concen-
trations of recently closed low-performing schools; 
and
3. Charter school restart (charter restart): Transfer-
ring management of an underperforming public 
charter school to new management and new board 
governance.
Restarting a traditional public school as a public charter 
school provides a failing school with new leadership that 
has the autonomy to operate the school, implement 
educational interventions, and—perhaps most important-
ly—hire staff with the necessary competencies to succeed 
in the turnaround environment. Despite recent efforts 
to encourage this strategy through SIG and Race to the 
Top, this approach has been relatively underutilized: Of 
Key Actors
• Education service providers (ESPs) are 
nonprofit or for-profit organizations 
that contract with schools or districts 
to provide education-related services. 
These services range from single pro-
grams to comprehensive school man-
agement.
• Public charter school operators are 
entities—generally nonprofit boards—
that hold the official charter from an 
authorizer and that operate the school. 
• Charter management organizations 
(CMOs) are nonprofit ESPs that oper-
ate or manage multiple public charter 
schools, under contract with govern-
ing boards, by centralizing or sharing 
certain functions or resources. 
• Education management organizations 
(EMOs) are for-profit ESPs that oper-
ate or manage multiple public charter 
schools by centralizing or sharing cer-
tain functions or resources.
the approximately 2,000 schools receiving SIG funds 
since 2010, only 79 used the restart model that leveraged 
charter autonomies.
This paper examines how the autonomy related to staff-
ing, curriculum, and general operations provided by state 
charter laws can be used to catalyze school turnaround 
efforts. Specifically, it explores the TPS restart model 
through brief case studies of three charter management 
organizations (CMOs)—Green Dot, LEAD, and Mastery—
that have restarted traditional public schools in Los An-
geles, Nashville, and Philadelphia and Camden, respec-
tively. The case studies reveal the key autonomies that 
can foster turnaround efforts; identify unique challenges 
associated with turning around persistently low-perform-
ing schools via conversion to charter status; and outline 
opportunities that have yet to be realized fully at the 
federal, state, and district levels, and by charter opera-
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tors. Sources for this brief include federally acquired data, 
annual reports from public charter school operators, pub-
lished research studies, interviews with education leaders, 
and interviews with senior staff from three CMOs.
Of the approximately 2,000 schools receiving 
SIG funds since 2010, only 79 used the restart 
model that leveraged public charter school au-
tonomies. The restart model requires the district 
to convert the traditional public school to public 
charter school status and to allow it to be man-
aged by an outside operator, CMO, or educa-
tion management organization (EMO) selected 
through a rigorous process.  
STRATEGIES TO  
LEVERAGE CHARTER  
AUTONOMY 
Turnaround is the action of implementing numerous 
structural, operational, academic, and wraparound sup-
port changes to dramatically improve student achieve-
ment in a persistently low-performing school. Over the 
last 15 years, school districts have utilized various forms 
of the restart model, sometimes called reconstitution 
or restructuring, under the No Child Left Behind Act. 
The restart model is a type of turnaround that occurs 
when a low-performing school is closed or converted to 
charter status and a new school, operated by different 
management and governance, replaces the school in the 
same building or nearby (if the original building is not 
suitable). Under the TPS restart model, all of the students 
who previously attended the low-performing school are 
automatically eligible for enrollment at the new one.
Although the focus of the case studies of this paper is 
on TPS restarts, it is helpful to understand the three key 
strategies available to turn around failing schools through 
public charter school autonomy; they are discussed be-
low and in Table 1.
TPS Restart Model
TPS restarts are low-performing district-run schools that 
are converted to charter school status and managed by 
charter school operators, CMOs, or EMOs. TPS restarts 
may be triggered by federal, state, or district account-
ability designations. If applicable, federal SIG funds may 
support the costs of implementation. 
Some TPS restarts that received funding from the SIG 
program produced, and continue to produce, strong 
results (as evidenced by the case studies on the following 
pages). But other TPS restarts failed to show substan-
tial progress.5  Several factors may contribute to the 
less-than-optimal improvements, including but not limit-
ed to the following factors: 
• Providers may have lacked the capacity to take on 
the job of turning around a chronically low-per-
forming school. 
• Local education agencies (LEAs) may not have been 
able to recruit or select the best provider to lead the 
restart. 
• LEAs may not have provided adequate support 
or autonomy for the providers to implement the 
restart with fidelity.
Due to the limited number of restarts nationally, two 
national studies of SIG that have been completed thus far 
were unable to draw statistically significant conclusions 
on the impact of the TPS restart model.6  As a result of 
the limited national data analysis, case studies of TPS 
restarts are our best way to learn about the model and its 
viability as a strategy to catalyze effective turnaround. 
Closure/Replacement of  
Traditional Public Schools
Closing a low-performing traditional public school and 
launching one or more new public charter schools in the 
same neighborhood—operated by a charter organiza-
tion, CMO, or EMO—is another means by which charter 
school autonomy may be leveraged to support turn-
around efforts. In this model, unlike a TPS restart, districts 
or states close the low-performing schools; authorize 
one or more new charter schools to operate in the same 
physical building (or nearby, if more than one charter 
school is authorized or the original building is in inap-
propriate condition); and enroll the students from the 
neighborhood. One example of the widespread imple-
mentation of this approach is in state-run extraordinary 
authority districts, such as Louisiana’s Recovery School 
District (RSD). Over time, the RSD closed all traditional 
public schools and replaced them with charter schools. 
The all–charter school district shows promising results in 
terms of graduation rates and student proficiency.7  But 
converting an entire district to charter schools requires 
a great deal of community engagement to help assuage 
loyalty to the closing school, create political willpower to 
face systemic changes, and—most importantly—create a 
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supply of high-quality charter school operators willing to 
enter the market. 
Charter School Restart Model
A relatively new development in the public charter school 
sector is charter school operators, CMOs, or EMOs taking 
over the management of other low-performing charter 
schools. This type of turnaround is called a charter school 
restart. When existing charter schools fail to meet the 
performance requirements of their charter or to respond 
to internal turnaround efforts, the charter school’s autho-
rizer can revoke the charter (which essentially closes the 
school) or the board can turn the school over to another 
charter school operator, with new governance, in order 
to improve the quality of education. This type of turn-
around is seen mostly in cities with large concentrations 
of charter schools. 
Table 1: New Start Charter Schools Compared to Charter Approaches to School Turnaround
New Start Charter 
School TPS Restart 
Charter School 
Restart 10
TPS Closure and 
Replacement with one 
or more Charters
Operator 
Management
New operator and staff LEA(or state education 
agency [SEA]) selects 
charter school operator 
through authorization 
process; invite staff to 
reapply for positions; 
new principal
Authorizer or charter 
board selects new 
operator;
New operators selected 
by LEA/SEA and/
or existing schools 
expanded
Governance New Board New Board New Board New Board
Students Open enrollment or 
lottery if oversubscribed
Existing and 
neighborhood-zoned 
students guaranteed 
seats
Existing students 
guaranteed seats, lottery 
if oversubscribed
Students from closed 
school receive priority in 
replacement schools
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While aspects of a charter school restart are similar to 
a TPS restart, there are a few differences. For example, 
in some cases, a public charter school restart might be 
slightly easier than a TPS restart: Underperforming public 
charter schools have a shorter history of low perfor-
mance, so the communities are less tied to the failing 
institution.8  In contrast, a difficulty that charter school 
operators must address is that families chose to apply and 
attend the original school model. And while the students 
are automatically accepted to the restarted school, the 
families lose some of the control they felt in making their 
initial choice.9  For example, a family could have selected 
a public charter school with classes separated by gender, 
because the parents thought that would be the best 
learning environment for their child. The new charter 
school operator may combine genders in classes. There-
fore, the desirable aspect of the original model is lost.
Examples of TPS Restart
In an effort to understand how public charter school autonomy is being used to support turnaround efforts, we iden-
tified three examples of charter school operators restarting traditional public schools. The three operators were select-
ed because of their diverse locations across the country and varying organizational size, and all three operators have 
implemented TPS turnarounds with and without the use of SIG funds. Research included phone interviews and email 
correspondence with executives of each organization, and review of organizational websites and annual reports. Table 2 
includes profiles of the three CMOs researched for this paper. 
Table 2: Case Study CMOs – At a Glance  
Green Dot Public Schools LEAD Public Schools Mastery Charter Schools
Mission
Help transform public education 
so all students graduate prepared 
for college, leadership, and life. 
LEAD Public Schools exists to 
support, educate, and train the 
next generation of responsible 
citizens.
All students learn the academic 
and personal skills they need 
to succeed in higher education, 
compete in the global economy, 
and pursue their dreams. 
TPS restart approach
Whole school; focus on quality 
staff and wraparound services 
Grade-by-grade phase-in/
out; focus on quality staff and 
wraparound services
Whole school; focus on quality 
staff and wraparound services 
Total number of schools 22 5 15
Number of TPS restart 
schools
8 11 2 12 10
Total # of students enrolled 11,000 1,700 10,500
Grades served 6–12 5–12 K–12
Student retention 91% N/A 13 93%
Graduation rate 88% 100% 14 95%
Free/Reduced Meals 93% 92% 95%
English Language Learners 18% 15% 5%
Special Education 12% 15% 18%
African American 21% 54% 94%
Latino/ Hispanic 77% 26% 4%
White 0.5% 18% 1%
Asian 0.2% 2% 1%
Number of central office 
staff
187 15 15 90
Percentage of funds to 
school programming
92% 91% 92%
Headquarters Los Angeles, CA Nashville, TN Philadelphia, PA
Location of schools
Los Angeles, CA; Memphis, TN; 
and Tacoma, WA 16  
Nashville, TN Philadelphia, PA and Camden, 
NJ
Website www.greendot.org/ www.leadpublicschools.org/ www.masterycharter.org/
8Charter ing Turnaround: Leveraging Publ ic  Charter  School  Autonomy to Address Fai lure
GREEN DOT PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Green Dot Public Schools is a CMO that manages a 
large portfolio of middle and high schools; it includes 14 
new start charter schools and four TPS restarts (divided 
into eight smaller schools). The majority of schools are 
based in Los Angeles, California, with additional clusters 
of schools launching in Memphis, Tennessee, and the 
Seattle/Tacoma area of Washington. Some of the Los 
Angeles schools targeted for turnaround were very large, 
and Green Dot reconfigured them into smaller acade-
mies in order to personalize the school experience for 
the large number of students and staff, and to improve 
accountability as it relates to school culture and student 
outcomes. Although Green Dot was awarded federal SIG 
funds to assist with the turnaround of one middle school 
under Title I accountability parameters, the other TPS 
restarts were driven by district and state public charter 
school accountability mechanisms. These schools did not 
receive additional federal funds specifically allocated for 
turnaround.
Green Dot entered the turnaround space in 2008, when 
it took over operational control of Locke High School 
from Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), after 
more than 51 percent of the tenured teachers—in 
accordance with California charter school laws—voted 
to turn over management of the school to Green Dot. 
The sheer size of Locke, the range of student needs, the 
culture of low expectations, and a chronic history of low 
performance catapulted Green Dot into a steep multiyear 
learning process in terms of what it takes to transform an 
existing school effectively. The requirements proved cat-
egorically different from typical new start charter school 
practice in which culture is built one grade at a time. 
The work at Locke informed Green Dot’s best practices 
organizationwide, leading to significant modifications 
in school models for both new start charter schools and 
subsequent TPS restarts.
Green Dot’s Turnaround Approach 
Green Dot’s turnaround approach for TPS restarts in-
volves a complete reorganization of the former school, 
including new leadership and a requirement that all staff 
members reapply to ensure that they are appropriately 
qualified and aligned with the new vision for the school. 
Reflecting on the process, Marco Petruzzi, CEO of Green 
Dot, explained, “If you’re not doing something incredibly 
different related to staffing and the instructional model, 
then you’re not doing a turnaround. This bottom five 
percent of schools needs radical intervention, not tin-
kering along the edges.”18  Green Dot aspires to retain 
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Organizational Profile  
Mission Help transform public educa-
tion so all students graduate 
prepared for college, leader-
ship, and life.
Total Number of Schools 22
TPS Restart Schools 8 33
Charter Restart Schools 0
New Start Schools 14
Turnaround Approach Whole school; focus on 
quality staff and wraparound 
services
Number of Students  
Enrolled
11,000
Grades Served 6–12
Student Retention 91%
Graduation Rate 88%
Free/Reduced Lunch 93%
English Language Learners 18%
Special Education 12%
African-American 21%
Latino/Hispanic 77%
White 0.5%
Asian 0.2%
Number of Central Office 
Staff
187 (including all three 
regions)
Percentage of Funds  
Going to School  
Programming
92%
Headquarters Los Angeles, California
Location of schools Los Angeles, California; 
Memphis, Tennessee; and 
Tacoma, Washington (com-
ing fall 2015)
Website www.greendot.org
closing-school staffers who are aligned to the new vision 
and who possess the skills to help establish a culture 
of high expectations and implement new instructional 
practices. This has an added benefit of safeguarding 
important threads in institutional and community memo-
ry, and generating continuity for families. Experience has 
shown that the majority of the staff often needs signifi-
cant retraining and, in most cases, should be replaced. 
Petruzzi reflected, “If you can keep a few faces that are 
familiar to the students, then that can be of great benefit. 
These schools are failing mostly because of the adults, 
both the ones at the school and the ones supporting 
them from the district. You need to bring in a whole new 
set of programs, supports, values, and energy to deliver 
a dramatically different experience for the kids, which is 
what we aim for.” 
At Locke High School, Green Dot’s first TPS restart, man-
agement decided to retain 30 percent of the staff from 
the closing school. Under California’s teacher trigger law, 
51 percent of the teachers had to agree to convert the 
school to charter school status. Petruzzi commented, 
“Many of the teachers expected to be hired since they 
signed the petition. However, not all of them interviewed 
and some were not considered qualified, so it led to 
some difficult conversations.”19  Petruzzi noted that many 
of the people they rehired did not adjust well to the new 
culture; however, others remained and are still with the 
school. Green Dot did not rehire any original staff in the 
next two turnarounds, in large part because no one ap-
plied after undergoing significant pressure from LAUSD’s 
union. In Memphis, Green Dot plans to rehire as many 
well-qualified staff as possible at the TPS restart schools, 
but that number could be low—potentially less than 25 
percent. The objective is not to retain or rehire a specif-
ic number, but Green Dot leadership noted that hiring 
quality personnel from the existing staff is a net positive 
for students.20
With Locke, Green Dot used a phase-in/out approach to 
transform the school and build a new culture, starting 
several new ninth grade academies and growing them 
one grade at a time while shrinking two larger 10th–12th 
grade academies year by year. Green Dot managed the 
entire school; it did not rely on the district to manage 
the “shrinking” academies. In hindsight, Petruzzi felt that 
the slow scale-up inadvertently led to tension on campus 
for an extended period of time: In effect, the phase-out 
strategy ensured that a “hot topic of conversation for 
four years was whether the adults in the disappearing 
grades would be displaced or offered a role in the grow-
ing academies.” Learning from the experience, the Green 
Dot team decided that subsequent turnarounds would be 
completed by beginning the turnaround throughout the 
whole school at once in order to maintain staff unity and 
cohesion from year one. It also ensured a more “normal” 
experience for the upper grades. 
Despite being based in Los Angeles, Green Dot has been 
unable to lead additional turnarounds or new starts in 
that area since 2011. This has been due to a changing 
political climate and negotiations between the superin-
tendent and the teachers union. Consequently, Green 
Dot began seeking new opportunities elsewhere to apply 
its turnaround work in other districts seeking to lever-
age charter school autonomies to drive turnaround. The 
leadership team remains hopeful that it will have the 
opportunity to lead additional turnarounds in Los Angeles 
in the future. 
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Graph 1: Proficiency Rates for Students Entering Green Dot’s TPS Restart Schools Are  
Significantly Lower
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In order to launch successful turnarounds in other re-
gions, Green Dot has been investing in its infrastructure 
to build regional hubs to support the schools. Green 
Dot’s operational practices require significant collabora-
tion between schools to share promising practices; oper-
ational systems (e.g., hiring, professional development, 
human resources, facilities, etc.); coaches; and central 
office personnel across the network. Green Dot invest-
ed substantial philanthropic funds to build the CMO’s 
infrastructure in Memphis during negotiations with the 
district and even before starting the hard work in the 
schools. 
How a TPS Restart Is Different from 
Opening a New School
Petruzzi reflected how different and challenging TPS 
restarts are compared with launching new public charter 
schools. He commented, “It’s a different animal. The lift is 
much heavier. With [new start public charter schools], it’s 
difficult to be successful all the time, but we have made 
great progress towards a more consistently replicable and 
successful school model.” In the turnaround space, there 
are many more variables; flexibility and problem solving 
on the fly is key. For example, in TPS restarts, students 
can enroll at any point during the year, with massive vari-
ance in levels of credits, and with a wide range of abilities 
and disabilities, which is not always the case in new start 
charter schools. Students are accepted year-round in any 
grade and with as many or as few credits as they hold, 
and with any disability; students are rarely expelled, and 
only for egregious acts; students are enrolled as they 
register to attend the school, regardless of whether there 
are openings; and no application or lottery is required. In 
a recent blog posting, Petruzzi discussed the challenges 
of unlimited inbound enrollment of students:
At Locke HS we receive 10–15 new students a 
week every week, all the way until the last week of 
school. … [This] is indeed disruptive to the culture 
and classroom structures that have been set up. It 
is certainly difficult on the adults and often disrup-
tive for other students. But high transiency rates are 
endemic in [high-poverty] communities and we need 
to learn to cope with the issues. It has forced us to 
rethink dramatically how we onboard students into a 
new school; and how we create thorough but quick 
assessments to create the best possible class schedule 
for that student, [rather than] just fit him/her wher-
ever there’s room; and forced us to create a system 
of supports, including peer mentors to help the new 
students adapt.21 
In addition, students in turnaround schools have academ-
ic, emotional, and behavioral needs that tend to be more 
extreme and more prevalent than those of the student 
populations at both new starts and the district-run 
traditional public schools that the restarts replace. When 
Green Dot analyzed the data of incoming TPS restart 
students, the differences in students were notable. While 
a majority of students attending its charter schools are 
academically behind several grade levels, the students at 
the TPS restarts were even further behind: Higher per-
centages of students had special education needs and 
more severe needs, and the level of mental health needs 
was more acute. The differences in student academic 
proficiency are noted in Graph 1, which shows student 
proficiency rates on California’s Standardized Test (CST) 
for the state, the district, Green Dot’s average, and the 
subset of TPS restart schools. 
Petruzzi hypothesized that many of the students attend-
ing the TPS restart schools lack parental advocacy. Simply 
having an adult understand the possibility of applying to 
a public charter school and taking the action to apply to 
a lottery demonstrates some level of family engagement 
and commitment that, in theory, is an asset to the stu-
dent as he or she navigates school. In contrast, some of 
the students in the schools identified for turnaround
lack strong parental advocacy that may put them out 
of reach of charters. These “most wanting” students 
[as Green Dot refers to them], some of [whom] have 
extreme academic, social, emotional, mental health, 
or behavioral needs, might account for only 20 per-
cent of the population in a turnaround school—with 
the rest of the student population likely similar to 
those [of] “new start” charters in similar neighbor-
hoods—but they substantially impact the culture of 
the campus and have a powerful influence on how 
we must consequently serve all of our students. 
Before doing turnarounds, we thought we served the 
highest-need students, but we learned differently.23
Yet these differences have forced Green Dot to become a 
better, more nimble, and stronger organization. The les-
sons learned about how to support students with severe 
academic deficiencies and emotional needs have filtered 
into Green Dot’s work in new start charter schools. All of 
Green Dot’s schools are now more inclusive of all stu-
dents, utilize different enrollment procedures, include 
enhanced and improved special education supports, pro-
vide better transition programs, provide additional sup-
ports to students with emotional and behavioral needs, 
and offer additional credit recovery and remediation 
programs. Petruzzi reflected, “I would be lying to you if I 
told you we have figured it all out. We just embrace the 
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challenge, evaluate objectively what we do every year, 
and try to adapt and do it better the next year. But it is 
working: we have learned things in turnarounds that, in 
turn, we have adopted in our [new start public charter] 
schools and made those schools better and more inclu-
sive.”24 
“I would be lying to you if I told you we have 
figured it all out. We just embrace the chal-
lenge, evaluate objectively what we do every 
year, and try to adapt and do it better the next 
year. But it is working: we have learned things 
in turnarounds that, in turn, we have adopted 
in our [new start charter] schools and made 
those schools better and more inclusive.”
—Marco Petruzzi, CEO, Green Dot Public Schools 
Graph 2: The API Shows Gains in TPS 
Restart Schools Operated by Green Dot 
(Locke since 2008, Clay and Jordan since 
2011)
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Graph 3: API Performance of LAUSD’s SIG Cohort Demonstrates Strong Improvements in 
Green Dot’s Henry Clay Middle School
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Impact of Green Dot’s Turnarounds 
Despite significant obstacles, TPS restarts have made 
dramatic gains under Green Dot Operation. Green Dot 
conducts frequent data analyses to track progress and 
address issues as they arise in its schools. Like all schools, 
Green Dot struggles to track growth rates while state 
testing systems transition to Common Core–aligned tests; 
nevertheless, data demonstrate strong growth for Green 
Dot’s portfolio:
• Green Dot’s TPS restart schools have made measur-
able gains in student achievement. Graph 2 demon-
strates the changes in the Academic Performance 
Index (API)25 of three of Green Dot’s TPS restarts. 
The graph shows the API scores before Green Dot 
management and again in 2013. 
• When Green Dot’s TPS restart model is compared 
with the four other Los Angeles middle schools that 
were part of the same SIG funding cohort (2011), 
Green Dot’s Henry Clay outperforms across a variety 
of metrics (Graph 3).26 
• A University of California – Los Angeles study found 
that the first two cohorts of Locke students were 
more than 1.5 times more likely to graduate and 
3.7 times more likely to graduate college-ready than 
students were before the restart.27  
• The four-year cohort retention rate has doubled at 
Locke, which has the longest track record under 
Green Dot operation, and its students are 12 times 
more likely to go to college.28  
• Student retention rates for SY13–14 are 83 percent, 
92 percent, and 85 percent for Locke, Clay, and 
Jordan, respectively.29 
Furthermore, the impact of the TPS restarts goes be-
yond the turning around of individual schools: Green 
Dot learned a great deal from the Locke turnaround and 
significantly modified its school models both for new 
start schools and for subsequent turnarounds in order to 
better reflect the needs of the most at-risk students in all 
of its schools.32
Photo by Nora Kern
LEAD PUBLIC SCHOOLS
LEAD Public Schools is a CMO currently managing two 
TPS restarts in Nashville. It is in the process of launching 
a third this summer. In addition, LEAD manages three 
new start charter schools. LEAD’s first new start charter 
school included lottery enrollment and was designed to 
serve the same percentage of special education students 
that districts do (10–15 percent). LEAD provides transpor-
tation for its students to ensure that getting to and from 
school is not a barrier to families.
LEAD’s first TPS restart school, Cameron College Prep, 
predated the creation of Tennessee’s state extraordi-
nary authority district—the Achievement School District 
(ASD)34 —but the ASD existed in statute. In anticipation 
of Cameron being identified as one of the lowest 5 per-
cent schools in the state and subject to state takeover un-
der the ASD, the district and LEAD began conversations 
about how they could proactively improve the school. 
The district determined that initiating a turnaround by 
restarting the school as a charter school, under LEAD’s 
management, was preferable to a potential ASD takeover. 
In 2011, this TPS restart became LEAD’s first turnaround 
school and was initiated under partnership between the 
district and charter school. Shortly thereafter, LEAD ap-
plied to the ASD to operate additional TPS restart schools 
identified for turnaround and converted to public charter 
school status. Based on LEAD’s application and initial re-
finements to their model with Cameron College Prep, the 
ASD approved LEAD as the CMO to turn around another 
school. LEAD assumed management of Brick Church 
College Prep and opened a fifth grade in summer 2012, 
with plans to expand one grade at a time. LEAD received 
SIG funds to support the costs of turning around Brick 
Church. In fall 2015, LEAD will launch a second turn-
around via the ASD. In addition, LEAD is in discussions 
with Nashville Public Schools to turn around additional 
low-performing schools.35
LEAD’s Turnaround Approach 
LEAD uses a grade-by-grade phase-in/out approach to 
turn around low-performing schools. For example, if 
LEAD restarts a middle school of fifth to eighth graders, it 
will start the turnaround process with the incoming fifth 
grade class; the following year, the school would include 
another class of incoming fifth graders and the now sixth 
graders. It takes four years to fully phase-in/out a four-
grade school. During the transition, LEAD must collab-
orate and align with the district to maintain a sense of 
continuity and coordination between the two coexisting 
schools sharing the same building. Based on conversa-
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Organizational Profile
Mission LEAD public schools exists 
to support, educate, and 
train the next generation of 
responsible citizens.
Total Number of Schools 5
TPS Restart Schools 2 42
Charter Restart Schools 0
New Start Schools 3
Turnaround Approach Grade-by-grade phase-in/
out; focus on quality staff 
and wraparound services 
Number of Students  
Enrolled
1,700
Grades Served 5–12
Student Retention N/A 43
Graduation Rate 100% 44
Free/Reduced Lunch 92%
English Language Learners 15%
Special Education 15%
African-American 54%
Latino/Hispanic 26%
White 18%
Asian 2%
Number of Central Office 
Staff
15
Percentage of Funds  
Going to School  
Programming
91%
Headquarters Nashville, Tennessee 
Location of schools Nashville, Tennessee
Website www.leadpublicschools.org
tions with the leadership team at LEAD, the CMO uses 
the phase-in/out model for a variety of reasons, including 
the following: 
• The slower scale-up allows for a principal to grow 
into the position.
• Hiring one grade level of staff at a time is more fea-
sible than hiring staff for an entire school.
• The district is able to absorb and reassign one phas-
ing-out grade level of teachers each year. 
• It provides the phasing-out teachers the opportunity 
to choose to apply for positions at the TPS restart.
• It’s the least disruptive approach for the students 
and the community:
  The incoming fifth graders already anticipate 
attending a new school with new teachers. 
  The remaining sixth through eighth graders 
continue to have the same teachers. 
  No students are displaced. 
The phase-in/out approach, however, can be controver-
sial, as some parents questioned the quality of education 
for those students in phasing-out grades. Chris Reynolds, 
CEO of LEAD, understood this concern but believed that 
the phase-in/out approach was the best way to do a 
TPS restart for LEAD because, he said, “Running a char-
ter school is a big lift, running a high-poverty charter 
is an even bigger lift, running a high-poverty charter 
turnaround is even more so. We needed to structure the 
transition in a way that it’s sustainable and the least dis-
ruptive to kids.”36  LEAD managed the lower grade levels 
and grew one grade level each year; the district managed 
the remaining grade level and shrunk one grade level 
each year. 
Ensuring that both schools coexist and coordinate to 
share the same physical space can be challenging. LEAD 
learned a great deal from its first TPS restart and is imple-
menting those lessons in subsequent turnaround efforts. 
For instance, it now has weekly planning meetings be-
tween the LEAD principal and the phase-out principal to 
discuss any shared needs, how to share space, and how 
to coordinate shared electives (e.g., art, music, etc.). 
Beyond this need for coordination, the phase-in/out 
process can be complicated by the length of the school 
day. The LEAD students attend school an extra 1.5 hours 
a day and an extra week each year. Reynolds stated, “We 
consider all the kids our kids, so we try to support the 
students in the phase-out grades as well.” For example, 
in cases of siblings split between the phase-in/out, LEAD 
works with families to run different bus routes, provide 
before- or afterschool study halls, or offer additional activ-
ities for the siblings in the shorter school days. Reynolds 
commented that there can be some parental frustration 
in the first semester due to the coordination issues, but 
by the end of the year, the frustration shifts, and parents 
are more focused on the lack of quality education the 
older kids receive from the phasing-out traditional public 
school.37 
“We’re not doing anything magical, we’re just 
doing the hard work.”
—Chris Reynolds, CEO, LEAD Public Schools
When asked about his approach to turning around failing 
schools, Reynolds reflected, “We’re not doing anything 
magical, we’re just doing the hard work. Our kids go to 
school a little longer, we use time efficiently during the 
day, we select staff based on their mindset, and we train 
staff a lot. If we do all those things, while still building a 
culture that honors individual student interests, then the 
conditions are right for kids to learn.” LEAD staff is pro-
vided three weeks of training each summer, an additional 
eight days of professional development during the year, 
and additional job-embedded professional development. 
Reynolds views professional development as a crucial 
component of LEAD’s work. He remarked, “The phas-
ing-out teachers aren’t bad teachers, but they need more 
training. We have to invest in the adults to help the kids. 
We can’t import talent at the quantity we need to solve 
problems, like cities such as Boston or New Orleans can, 
due to the size and attractiveness of the city for recent 
graduates. We imported some staff, but we need to 
develop strong staff already in Nashville through strong 
professional development or through alternative certifica-
tion and better teacher preparation programs.”38
LEAD encourages every teacher in the phase-out grades 
to apply for a job in the upcoming phase-in grades. All 
existing teachers are guaranteed to make it through the 
first round of the application process and to receive an in-
terview and the ability to present a demonstration lesson. 
In addition, existing teachers are screened before LEAD 
opens up the candidate pool to the public. During the 
phase-out years, teachers and staff have the opportunity 
to share space, observe how the new teachers work, see 
how the new school operates, and observe how the new 
principal leads. Those teachers in the phase-out grades 
have a year or more to digest the changes and make 
their own decisions about applying or leaving. Reynolds 
commented that LEAD is open to rehiring some of the 
teachers who are phasing out, but to date, very few have 
applied. At Cameron, two phase-out teachers were hired 
in year one, and the LEAD team has since hired five other 
teachers from the phase-out grades. He said, “Teachers 
take it personally when their school is restarted. We’ve 
tried to get over that that by saying, ‘We’d like you to 
apply.’ There’s some emotional baggage of sharing space 
and there’s a [perception] that the phase-in teachers 
work harder [due to the longer days and years]. Over 
time, it’s likely that we’ll see an increase in applicants, but 
we don’t know how to fix it right now.”39 
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LEAD places a strong emphasis on professional devel-
opment, hiring strong administrators and teachers, and 
ensuring that the adult culture is conducive to success. 
Reynolds stated, “We really value our adult culture as 
much as our student culture. The entity matters; if the 
entity is healthy, it’ll feed the people.” In effect, by fo-
cusing on getting the right people in the right seats on 
the bus, and providing them the right skills and supports 
they need to do their jobs well, the organization can re-
cruit strong new talent, build from within, and ultimately 
serve students well.
In effect, by focusing on getting the right peo-
ple in the right seats on the bus, and providing 
them the right skills and supports they need to 
do their jobs well, the organization can recruit 
strong new talent, build from within, and ulti-
mately serve students well.
How a Restart Is Different from  
Opening a New School
LEAD learned quickly that the communities did not know 
how low-performing the schools really were until it start-
ed engaging the families and community leaders about 
the status of the schools and the forthcoming changes. 
Reynolds stated that it was a shock to the neighborhood 
to learn the truth about the quality of education their stu-
dents had been receiving. As a result, despite the prom-
ises of a better school launching in the same building 
and LEAD’s efforts to enroll all of the previous students, 
many parents opted their children out—in some cases 
reportedly due to the family’s new recognition of how 
poorly the school had performed previously. As a result of 
student departures, many of which came to pass simply 
because families were involved enough to learn that an 
opt-out was possible, the overall average proficiency rates 
of returning students were lower and the proportion of 
students with disabilities who qualify for special educa-
tion doubled. Reynolds noted, 
Due to opting out and the new perceptions of the 
former school, the readiness of the incoming stu-
dents dropped significantly from prior years. Our 
student population included the most vulnerable 
kids, who were the furthest behind. In some cases, 
we found that the pre-conversion poverty proportion 
for a school was 94–96 percent. Post-conversion, the 
proportion increased to 98 percent. Special educa-
tion rates jumped from 18 percent to 34 percent in 
year one before stabilizing at about 25 percent in 
later years. 
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In effect, a LEAD turnaround school serves a population 
of students even further behind and more disadvantaged 
than did the traditional public school it replaced. 
LEAD also faced new enrollment challenges in its TPS 
restarts, even though it had experience with enrolling 
students throughout the school year in its new start 
charter schools. As an organization, LEAD determined 
that it would increase access to its new start schools by 
backfilling open seats through ninth grade and through-
out the school year, by grouping students into cohorts 
(i.e., each month new students would enroll together to 
ease the transition for both the students and the schools). 
However, unlike new start charter schools—which deter-
mine enrollment through lottery if there are insufficient 
seats available and can choose whether or not to backfill 
empty seats—TPS restart schools enroll students based 
on neighborhood zones, and they are required to enroll 
at any time during the year. Consequently, LEAD must 
enroll students any day and in any grade throughout 
the year at the TPS restart schools. Combining unlimit-
ed inbound enrollment and high mobility rates due to 
poverty, LEAD found that 20 percent to 30 percent of test 
takers in April were not enrolled in the school in the early 
fall.40  
Impact of LEAD’s Turnarounds 
It is still too early to determine if LEAD’s turnaround 
schools are a success—and if their improvements are 
sustainable—but the initial findings are promising: 
• Cameron College Prep (a TPS restart launched in 
2011) was recognized as a Reward School for Prog-
ress, meaning it was in the top 5 percent of schools 
statewide in year-over-year growth. 
• Brick Church College prep (a TPS restart launched 
in 2012) showed the largest gains in the entire ASD. 
In just two years, it has moved from a bottom 5 
percent school to being on track to become a top 
25 percent school within five years.
• The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System 
ranks every school in the state based on growth on 
a scale of 1 to 5. All of LEAD’s campuses exceed the 
state norm for growth; three have Level 5, the top 
ranking available; and one is rated Level 4.41 
In addition to the data on LEAD’s TPS restarts, LEAD’s 
new start charter school campuses also continue to 
demonstrate strong student growth, and early bench-
mark indicators suggest that the LEAD model is working 
and effectively educating some of Nashville’s most at-risk 
students.
Mastery Charter Schools
Mastery Charter Schools is a CMO that manages 12 char-
ter schools located in 15 buildings in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, and Camden, New Jersey. Ten of the schools are 
TPS restarts and seven of them received SIG restart funds 
to support their turnaround efforts. Mastery opened its 
first new start charter school in 2001 and its first TPS 
restart in 2006. Mastery launched TPS restarts under two 
different district superintendents: 
• The Turnaround Initiative, created under former 
Philadelphia Superintendent Paul Vallas in 2005, 
targeted chronically low-performing middle schools 
to bring about dramatic improvement in student 
achievement.45  
• Introduced in 2010 by former Philadelphia Superin-
tendent Arlene Ackerman, the Renaissance Schools 
Initiative was designed to turn around the city’s 
lowest-performing schools by working with school 
communities that select the school operator that 
has a proven track record of operating and support-
ing high-achieving schools.46  Schools are converted 
to charter school status and managed by a charter 
school operator, EMO, or CMO. Each school also 
had a school advisory council to help select the 
operator, support the charter school transition, and 
monitor progress. 
While the district leadership and strategies varied, the 
need for turnaround and Mastery’s model for imple-
mentation remained similar. Mastery defines turnaround 
schools as “neighborhood schools that take the same stu-
dents from the same neighborhood in the same building 
while changing the management of the school, imple-
menting new systems, and bringing in new staff.”47  
Mastery’s approach to turnaround focuses on using rig-
orous curriculum and engaging instructional techniques 
to bring students up to grade level as quickly as possible. 
Mastery school leaders place significant attention on 
school culture, creating respectful learning environments 
and providing appropriate social-emotional supports to 
students. Staff members collaborate regularly and make 
data-informed decisions to target resources to both stu-
dents and support staff.48  
While Mastery’s initial new starts expanded one grade at 
time, the TPS restarts—and all new starts going for-
ward—employ a whole-school takeover model to make 
dramatic changes quickly. Scott Gordon, CEO of Mastery, 
remarked, “We love turnaround work. It’s certainly chal-
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Organizational Profile
Mission All students learn the aca-
demic and personal skills 
they need to succeed in 
higher education, compete 
in the global economy, and 
pursue their dreams.
Total Number of Schools 15
TPS Restart Schools 10
Charter Restart Schools 0
New Start Schools 5
Turnaround Approach Whole school; focus on 
quality staff and wraparound 
services 
Number of Students  
Enrolled
10,500
Grades Served K–12
Student Retention 93%
Graduation Rate 95%
Free/Reduced Lunch 95%
English Language Learners 5%
Special Education 18%
African-American 94%
Latino/Hispanic 4%
White 1%
Asian 1%
Number of Central Office 
Staff
90
Percentage of Funds  
Going to School  
Programming
91.5%
Headquarters Philadelphia, PA
Location of schools Philadelphia, PA, and  
Camden, NJ
Website www.masterycharter.org
lenging, and we’re definitely working with many of the 
kids with the greatest needs, but it’s very satisfying and 
important work.”49  
How a Restart Is Different from  
Opening a New School
Compared with Mastery’s new starts, the TPS restarts 
have open enrollment from the surrounding neigh-
borhoods, the schools enroll higher percentages of 
low-income and special education students, students 
are enrolled any day of the year via unlimited inbound 
enrollment, and the organization makes a concerted 
effort to retain all of the students. Expulsions rarely occur, 
but when they are necessary, Mastery follows relevant 
state law and district disciplinary policies. Also, Mastery 
offers additional mental health supports to meet student 
needs.50  Gordon reflected, “The higher concentration 
of students with needs [e.g., special education, behav-
ioral, emotional, and mental] is one of the reasons these 
schools haven’t been successful in the past. Students 
frequently didn’t receive the coordinated services and 
supports they need to be successful. Oftentimes, staff 
tried to meet those needs but was unable to shift from 
putting out emergencies to proactive strategies.” Security 
concerns in the high schools also present new issues and 
costs. Gordon continued, “A violent high school culture 
can put kids and teachers at serious risk. In addition, the 
older students are often much further behind academ-
ically. It’s a very different undertaking than [with] the 
younger grades. [For the high schools,] we need to pro-
vide more security, safety, and student support strategies 
upfront compared to the younger grades, and we need 
to provide additional programs for students to catch up 
academically. Both of those items carry significant costs.” 
In neighborhood schools, students often enroll in the 
school based on where they live, rather than proactively 
seeking out the school—as in a traditional public charter 
school with a lottery. Gordon noted, “In a [new] start 
charter, you’re essentially presenting your school and 
the families can choose you … or not. In a turnaround 
situation, we need to reach out to the communities and 
build trust. It is important to listen to the community and 
understand what they need. We needed to develop our 
capacity to do additional engagement work and earn the 
communities’ trust and acceptance.” 
Operationally, there are several big differences for Mas-
tery between new starts and TPS restarts. First, the scale 
is different. Mastery built its initial new start charter 
schools using a phase-in process, one grade at a time, 
but the TPS restarts were done with the whole school at 
once. Gordon feels that the whole-school turnaround at 
once is the least disruptive approach for the community. 
It’s also the approach that the district leadership required. 
Programmatically, this method required Mastery to pre-
pare leaders a year in advance and to start recruitment 
and teacher training before the CMO even stepped foot 
in the building. The CMO must have enough financial 
reserves to cover those additional costs, as negotiations 
with the district may be ongoing. 
Second, the finances for a TPS restart are different. 
While new start charter schools require significant facility 
costs in terms of acquiring buildings, with a turnaround 
“[CMOs get] a district facility already built, but [they’re] 
spending more money on [student] remediation, es-
tablishing the culture, and doing community outreach. 
Some of the costs are higher initially, but [they] also save 
in other areas. For example, the TPS restarts enroll at 
full capacity right away versus expanding one grade at 
a time, so [the CMO] isn’t paying for a partially empty 
building,” said Gordon. Mastery uses standard state and 
district per-pupil allocations and special education funds 
to cover the basic academic and programmatic costs, 
but additional funds are needed for capital costs such as 
equipment, books, supplies, facility updates, and main-
tenance. Those costs range from a half a million to 2 
million dollars per school, depending on its size and the 
condition of its building. The facility renovations are not 
complete overhauls of the structure, but they do include 
painting, replacing windows, and fixing broken items 
(e.g., water fountains, doors, toilets)—all basic features 
that are needed to create a welcoming place for stu-
dents.51  SIG funds do not cover these costs, and Mastery 
raises additional funds to cover facility renovations and 
improvements. Gordon stated, “We want the schools to 
break even in the first or second year on an operating 
basis. Additional money for psychologists and counselors 
is needed for the first year but usually goes away after the 
school is up and running.” 
Impact of Mastery’s Turnarounds 
Mastery’s schools, including the new starts and TPS 
restarts, have demonstrated dramatic academic improve-
ments and improved culture and climate in the schools. 
Mastery reported that 96 percent of the class of 2014 
earned college or postsecondary acceptance.52  Addition-
al impact data are presented on the following page in 
tables 3 and 4.
Student behavior at Mastery schools changed dramatical-
ly post-turnaround. After the partnership, schools saw an 
average of 80 percent reduction in school violence.55
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Table 3: PSSA   Growth in Nominal  
Percentage Increases from Year 1 of  
Mastery Turnaround to 2014 (i.e., nine 
years of data for Thomas and one year of 
data for Pastorius)
School and Launch Year Math Growth Reading Growth
Thomas Middle (FY06) +38% +51%
Shoemaker Middle 
(FY07)
+46% +34%
Pickett Middle (FY08) +63% +37%
Mann Elementary (FY11) +27% +12%
Smedley Elementary 
(FY11)
+20% +20%
Harrity Elementary 
(FY11)
+18% +20%
Clymer Elementary 
(FY12)
+20% +9%
Gratz High School 
(FY12)
+11% +9%
Cleveland Elementary 
(FY13)
+28% +17%
Pastorius Elementary 
(FY14)
+28% +14%
*11th grade PSSA administered in FY12, then discontinued by state.
53
54
Table 4: Change in Percentage of Students 
Withdrawing for Any Reason, September 
through June, Post-Mastery Turnaround 
(i.e., nine years of data for Thomas and one 
year of data for Pastorius)
School and Launch Year Change in Student 
Withdrawals
Thomas Middle (FY06) -71%
Shoemaker Middle 
(FY07)
-89%
Pickett Middle (FY08) -62%
Mann Elementary (FY11) -60%
Smedley Elementary 
(FY11)
-45%
Harrity Elementary 
(FY11)
-43%
Clymer Elementary 
(FY12)
-68%
Gratz High School 
(FY12)
-72%
Cleveland Elementary 
(FY13)
-69%
Pastorius Elementary 
(FY14)
-73%
Discussion of Key  
Findings
Dramatically turning around the performance of failing 
schools is a critical goal and persistent challenge for fed-
eral, state, and local policymakers and practitioners. The 
last four decades of school reform efforts have demon-
strated the significant barriers to substantial and sustain-
able reform. While not the panacea of school turnaround, 
when coupled with key actions documented to drive 
school turnaround (e.g., hiring strong leaders, reallocat-
ing resources, and leveraging data to drive decisions), the 
autonomies extended by state charter school laws have 
the potential to catalyze turnaround efforts. The follow-
ing are the charter school autonomies that were most 
beneficial in the case studies included here:
• Staffing: Freedom in hiring, placement, incentives, 
professional development, and removal of staff; 
• Use of Time: Freedom to determine the length of 
the school day or year and how to allocate student 
and staff time; 
• Programming: Freedom to determine the academ-
ic program and wraparound services; 
• Finances: Freedom to allocate district, state, and 
federal dollars to priority areas that benefit students; 
and 
• Access to Facilities: Freedom to own, maintain, and 
renovate a building, or have the building renovat-
ed and maintained by the district according to the 
operator’s standards. 
To date, relatively few states or districts have chosen 
to pursue charter school autonomies as a strategy for 
turnaround. Our examination of three TPS restarts 
documented various approaches to leveraging charter 
school autonomy and revealed emerging strategies and 
challenges. In addition to the many opportunities of the 
restart model, the associated challenges provide insight 
into why the strategy has been underutilized. These 
common approaches are instructive for federal, state, and 
local policymakers and practitioners who are interested in 
further exploring chartering to drive turnaround and to 
refine their strategies to improve failing schools.
Turning around Failing Schools Is 
More Complex than Starting New 
Ones 
Turning around a low-performing school by converting it 
to charter governance and enlisting new management is 
more difficult than launching a typical new start charter 
school. Whereas starting a new school from scratch poses 
notable challenges (e.g., securing a facility, developing a 
program from scratch, and creating operational systems), 
turning around an organization that has failed presents 
far more dynamic challenges (e.g., updating and main-
taining old facilities, introducing new programs, training 
any rehires, and hiring high-quality personnel). 
Figuring out how to balance the community needs and 
the politics of historical dysfunction while also meeting 
the educational, social, emotional, and behavioral needs 
of students—all in a short timeframe—requires a strong 
organization and strong leadership. Neerav Kingsland, 
former CEO of New Schools for New Orleans, comment-
ed, “Turnaround is much harder work. It requires caution 
and careful decision-making. If 100 CMOs can do [new] 
start charters, maybe five can do turnaround well.” 
Overlapping Accountability  
Systems
Charter school operators doing a TPS restart face addi-
tional accountability and reporting requirements than 
what may be required by their state charter school laws 
and other federal program requirements. State account-
ability systems, as well as grant regulations, may stip-
ulate that turnaround providers must develop detailed 
plans reflecting prescribed turnaround models and meet 
reporting and accountability requirements in addition 
to requirements stipulated by state charter school laws. 
The CMO leaders highlighted in our cases noted that the 
overlap of state and federal accountability and funding 
requirements added a layer of complexity to their work. 
Transitional Costs
Converting a failing school—be it a traditional public 
school or a charter school—to public charter school 
status under new leadership and with new governance 
has tangible transitional costs. For instance, the blurry 
lines associated with actually handing over a building, 
acquiring student and special education records, arrang-
ing bus routes and transportation, handing over the keys 
to the building, enrolling students, and getting up and 
running all require a great deal of staff time. In addition, 
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facilities can remain a contentious issue; all interviewees 
mentioned that disagreements about who is responsible 
for major capital repairs could bog down the transition 
process. Districts provide the buildings to the CMOs to 
manage, but they are often delivered in poor condition 
and are usually still owned by the district. 
The first few years also typically require additional funds 
for investments in extra technology equipment and in-
frastructure, academic supplies, mental health supports, 
and facility improvements. The leaders of the three orga-
nizations reported that although they strive to manage 
the academic and programmatic costs on the standard 
per-pupil allocation, but the transitional costs can make 
budgeting quite challenging. 
Specific costs range based on the school size and the 
condition of the building, but the CMO leaders estimat-
ed that additional transitional costs might range from 
half a million to 2 million dollars. Two of the CMOs were 
awarded federal CSP funds for some of their work. LEAD 
received a CSP grant for five schools, focusing on TPS 
restarts, which will total approximately 4 million dollars 
over the course of several years.56  Schools targeted for 
turnaround can also access federal SIG funds to cover 
some of these costs, but SIG grants are relatively restric-
tive and bureaucratic in terms of monitoring and report-
ing. Consequently, CMOs have raised additional philan-
thropic dollars to cover the planning year, renovation, 
and start-up costs for each turnaround school. 
These transition costs—both in the form of staff time 
and actual dollars—can serve as a deterrent to operators 
interested in entering the turnaround sector.
“We have access to SIG funds but can’t use the 
money in the ways that we want and that will 
best serve kids. We have access to a building, 
but it doesn’t meet kids’ needs, it costs more 
than it should in annual upkeep because of 
years of deferred maintenance, and we don’t 
own it—so can’t take out a mortgage on it. 
These factors really hold us back from the 
work that needs to be done.”
—Chris Reynolds, CEO, LEAD Public Schools 
“Grandfathered” Enrollment  
versus Parental Choice
As public schools of choice, charter schools must offer 
open enrollment, but the actual step of a parent ex-
ercising choice is, by definition, different from simply 
enrolling his or her child in their neighborhood school. 
This may lead to different levels of parental “buy-in” to 
the charter school’s educational mission. Further, CMO 
leaders observed that their restarts—compared with the 
schools they are replacing—often have student popu-
lations with higher percentages of students with social 
emotional needs and lower levels of academic attain-
ment. The leaders of the three organizations hypothesize 
that this difference is due to some parents, after learning 
about how poorly the district-run school was, opting to 
move their children to other schools. 
In addition, the CMO leaders noted that, based on their 
experience, both the number and diversity of students 
with disabilities enrolled in the neighborhood schools 
differed from what they typically saw in their new start 
charter schools. While recognizing their responsibility 
to enroll all students, the CMO leaders noted it was an 
adjustment that required them to rethink some of their 
programming to ensure they provided a full continuum 
of instructional options for students with a diverse array 
of disabilities. Green Dot’s Petruzzi reflected, “as a whole, 
many CMOs need to admit that they don’t often serve 
students with significant special education needs well, 
and turnarounds are a forcing function to learn how to 
do this better. It’s complicated and expensive, and we all 
know that the funding is inadequate to cover the needs 
of some students [that require intensive services and 
supports]. Special education isn’t funded very well across 
the nation.” 
Moving forward, the lessons learned and the opportuni-
ty to develop innovative special education programs in 
turnaround situations could be an important contribution 
led by CMOs, and it could benefit both public char-
ter schools and traditional public schools. Additionally, 
recent research indicates that the absence of parental 
choice in TPS restarts may not be a disadvantage.  A 
recent National Bureau for Economic Research study of 
middle students achievement in New Orleans and Boston 
found that their high disadvantaged student populations 
that are “grandfathered” into a school as part of a TPS re-
start or takeover make significant gains.57  The study also 
found the improvement comparable to those of students 
that attended a charter through a lottery process.
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Human Capital
Turnaround frequently entails significant changes in staff-
ing, which can have a residual impact on the community 
in that CMOs may immediately alienate community 
members who could be instrumental to gaining buy-in 
with the broader community. The cases revealed that the 
CMOs wrestled with the tension to retain some key staff 
members, in order to build community ties and ensure 
institutional memory, while striving to retain or hire the 
most qualified staff possible to lead the arduous turn-
around work. Efforts to balance the needs of veteran and 
new staff members were complicated in turnarounds; 
they involved phasing in new grades and associated staff, 
and phasing out existing personnel.
Building effective teacher and leader pipelines requires 
developing regional hubs of four to 10 schools to build 
a collaborative environment, and bringing in efficien-
cies that will function across the system. All three CMOs 
discussed the challenge of hiring high-quality staff, even 
in some small cities. The desire to build regional hubs 
and recruit high-quality staff may present a challenge for 
rural communities. National CMOs may be apprehensive 
about launching a partnership without a regional central 
office and city infrastructures to draw new staff. Green 
Dot, which is currently launching two regional hubs in 
midsize cities, is concerned about the ability to attract 
high-quality staff and plans to partner with programs like 
Teach for America to help with the initial staff recruit-
ment. The leaders from all three CMOs also commented 
that teacher and staff professional development must be 
extremely strong in order to build a staff with the skills 
and content expertise required for their schools. 
Facilities
Facilities were identified as a notable challenge by all 
three CMOs. While TPS restarts typically include the 
use of a building, which can be a huge asset to charter 
school operators as buildings are a large expense for new 
start charter schools, the quality of the buildings and 
confusion over who is responsible for their upkeep can 
be a major challenge. Chris Reynolds of LEAD schools 
explained that, 
Tennessee state law requires the district to provide 
the building to the CMO, but the statute doesn’t 
include any guidance around what to do about 
deferred maintenance, and these are some of the 
crummiest buildings in the city. [One of our turn-
arounds] needed $14 million to go towards deferred 
maintenance. Initially, the district took that school 
out of the capital budget because it was a charter 
school and felt they were no longer responsible for 
it. I had to go to the school board to fight for the 
school to get back on the list. Eventually, [the school] 
was put back on the list for capital improvements but 
wasn’t provided a timeline for improvements, essen-
tially continuing to defer maintenance and district 
responsibility. 
Sustainability
Turning around the failing school is only the first step; the 
true goal is to sustain the turnaround and ensure contin-
ued improvements in performance. Our cases revealed 
that district and CMO capacity as well as unrealistic time-
lines may undermine efforts to sustain the turnarounds.
Districts/CMO Capacity
Highly effective and efficient central offices are crucial to 
high-performing turnaround schools, and the CMO oper-
ators proposed that a larger portion of SIG funds be avail-
able to support central office structures of charter school 
operators. At this time, SIG funds only permit a small 
set-aside for district or charter school operator central 
office operations to support the SIG schools. In line with 
concerns about the high costs of transitioning to charter 
school status, the CMO leaders stressed that resources 
are needed to build centralized systems to support and 
sustain the turnaround efforts.
Timeline for Results and  
Institutionalizing New Programs 
Current state turnaround timelines, which are often 
determined by regulations associated with receipt of fed-
eral funds, create major time crunches for the operators 
turning around low-performing traditional public schools 
or public charter schools. Several interviewees noted that 
the operators often receive approval for a TPS restart in 
the middle of winter or early spring, which leaves a very 
short timeline to recruit and hire staff, train staff, analyze 
budgets, complete community outreach, enroll students, 
complete residency verifications, acquire special educa-
tion plans, acquire district records, and improve the facil-
ities. All of this work must be completed for a late-August 
beginning of the school year. While the operators would 
like to perform a deep diagnostic assessment of the 
existing school, there is barely enough time to address 
the urgent operational matters within a four-to-six-month 
timeline before launch. 
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Opportunities Outweigh  
Challenges 
While turning around failing schools is difficult and 
complex work, all three CMO leaders highlighted how 
rewarding it is and how much turnarounds have positive-
ly influenced the efficiency of the central office and the 
services provided in all of the operators’ schools. Marco 
Petruzzi of Green Dot stated, “I’d love to see the larger 
CMOs do this work—those that have the infrastructure 
and talent to think through these issues. It would push 
them to learn some of the same things we’ve learned. 
And, there’s just a huge need. We need more [providers] 
to get into the field.” Petruzzi reflected that turnarounds 
can be controversial and warns other operators “when 
you take over schools, you need to be ready for intensity 
at a level you will almost certainly not have encountered 
before. But, we shouldn’t shy away from the challenge 
just because it makes us uncomfortable. We know that 
what we’re doing works and is working for students. You 
just need to be prepared to stay the course in the face of 
resistance and push back.” Operators must have the po-
litical willpower to take on this type of work, but the field 
as a whole must also develop capacity by encouraging 
more operators to get into the turnaround space.
In addition, several interviewees suggested providing ad-
ditional funds to open new start charter schools in areas 
where low-performing schools have shut down. Neerav 
Kingsland commented, “The government needs to move 
away from only looking at the turnaround of existing 
schools, [and] instead shift to a focus on supporting en-
trepreneurs, and let great schools open.”58  The National 
Alliance for Public Charter Schools has also called for 
permitting the federal SIG funds to be used for the repli-
cation and expansion of high-quality schools. While still 
providing students with the educations they deserve, this 
approach would give students access to new, stronger 
schools; allow high-quality public charter school opera-
tors to begin new starts; expand successful schools; and 
avoid some of the pitfalls of turnarounds. Funds to open 
new charter schools or to expand existing ones could 
be awarded by states out of their Title I funds for school 
improvement, rather than allocating funds to LEAs.59
Conclusion
Autonomy extended by state charter school laws can 
catalyze focused school turnaround efforts. Yet, to date, 
states and districts have, arguably, not fully leveraged 
turnaround strategies that involved granting schools 
charter school status as part of the turnaround process. 
Adoption of chartering and leveraging charter school au-
tonomies as turnaround tools have been limited by both 
policy and practice. In states that use their public charter 
school laws to grant turnaround schools greater autono-
my, the manner in which the process is operationalized 
varies considerably. Table 5 features some of the pros and 
cons of the various models highlighted in this paper. 
High-quality public charter school operators, 
and the freedom they have to implement effec-
tive educational programs, could fundamen-
tally change the current thinking about school 
building–focused turnaround and improvement 
strategies.
Regardless of the original governance structure of a 
school (i.e., existing public charter school or traditional 
public schools), new management is frequently critical 
to effectively turn around a school and provide current-
ly enrolled students the educational opportunities they 
deserve. Federal and state policymakers should examine 
whether their school turnaround investments are leading 
to such fundamental changes in the schools that need 
the most significant interventions.
Moving forward, initiatives to improve the success rate 
of turnaround efforts need additional data and research 
to determine which strategies have the greatest promise. 
For instance, schools currently beginning restart efforts 
with the support of SIG funds must be further studied to 
determine whether there are differences between the var-
ious approaches; whether whole-school or phase-in mod-
els have different levels of success; and whether CMOs, 
EMOs, or other ESPs generate the strongest results. In 
addition, more studies about closure and replacement 
strategies, in lieu of a TPS restart, are necessary. Addition-
al research on non-SIG TPS restarts is also needed. 
High-quality public charter school operators, and the 
freedom they have to implement effective education-
al programs, could fundamentally change the current 
thinking about school building–focused turnaround and 
improvement strategies. Federal and state turnaround 
policies need to focus more on expanding access to a 
high-quality education within a community through 
restarts of traditional public schools and the creation 
of new start charter schools; such policies should also 
explore other ways that charter autonomies could ex-
pand opportunities for students attending low-achieving 
schools. Much work remains, however, to ensure that 
such efforts fully optimize key autonomies that can cata-
lyze change.
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Table 5: Pros and Cons of Turnaround Models that Leverage Charter School Autonomies
Turnaround 
Roles Pros Cons
TPS Restart
• Autonomy extended by state public charter 
school law
• Existing building provided
• Challenges strong providers to become 
more responsive
• Autonomy to dictate transition process 
(e.g., full takeover at once or phase-in/out)
• Access to federal grant funds (e.g., Title I)
• Existing student body enrolled
• Varied levels of autonomy
• Building may require significant capital  
investment to renovate
• Percentage of students with significant  
academic needs may be greater than that of 
the closing school
• Community distrust triggered by staff changes
• Community distrust of nontraditional public 
school
• Federal grant funds introduce regulations
Closure/
Replacement
• Ability to start a school from scratch
• Autonomy defined by state public charter 
school law
• Access to federal grant funds (e.g., Title I)
• Autonomy to dictate transition process 
(e.g., full takeover at once or phase-in/out)
• May need to acquire a building
• Need to recruit students from closed and  
surrounding schools
• Limited federal grant funds 
• Community distrust of nontraditional public 
school
Charter 
Restart
• Autonomy defined by state public charter 
school law
• Existing student body enrolled
• Access to existing building 
• Access to federal grant funds (e.g., Title I 
and Charter School Program)
• Building may require significant capital costs to 
renovate, or it may carry debt
• Challenge to take over whole school versus  
ability to use a phase-in process
• Frustration from families or students if desirable 
aspects of school program change
• Community distrust if staff are removed
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